



The Impact of Conflict between Village Apparatus and Consultative Committee on Community Services: A Case Study of Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai, North Lampung

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Abstract

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The presence of the Rural Consultative Body (BPD) as an embodiment of democracy in the countryside, turns out to be on the other side brought a shift in the pattern of power relations between several institutions in the rural areas due to region autonomy. The study follows a critical paradigm that emphasizes a qualitative approach, and data collection using observation, interview, and documentation. First research findings; there is a change in the pattern of power relations that are collaborative between institutions that exist in the countryside changed into patterns of power relations that are antagonistic. Second, antagonistic power relations are caused by the contestation of leadership, uniformity and interpretations of the authority of each institution. The conclusion of the research is the application of the law (UU. No.32/2004) had an impact on the shift in power relations in the countryside.

INTRODUCTION

Community participation in village democracy was bypassed to further colonial exploitation through local rulers. Political participation at the village level was revived in the early days of independence. This fact was evidenced by the birth of Law No. 22/1948, which was then translated into more detail in Law. No. 19 of 1965 concerning Praja Village, which positioned the village in a very strategic place, namely the right to regulate and manage its household, but not long afterwards, the political activities of the people were silenced again and only lived for a few years because the state transition process at that time was not yet over.¹

In Indonesia, long-established democracy has always been During the New Order era, the position of the village was placed as part of the political stability machine in order to achieve national development goals, as evidenced by the birth of Law No. 5 of 1979 concerning Village Government Principles, with this scheme practically the village has been subordinated to become an extension of the central government, in other words, the village is nothing but the central government in the village. After the reformation in 1998, marked by the collapse of the New Order regime, learning by making villages part of the state's hands, which not only marginalized and prospered village communities, became the fundamental reason for reviving village democracy.

In the era of reform/democracy through Law. No. 22/1999, villages were given the space to develop autonomy to become local self-government, with the strengthening of the authority to institute village regulations and the authority to manage their finances so that various budget packages sometimes went directly to the village treasury without going through the regional treasury beforehand, such as fresh

¹ Kutut Suwondo, "Civil Society Di Aras Lokal: Perkembangan Hubungan Antara Rakyat Dan Negara Di Pedesaan Jawa," (*No Title*), 2003. Hlm. 32

money.² However, on the other hand, the Law strengthened regional positions, which gave birth to small kings in the regions and resulted in the birth of horizontal and vertical conflicts. In addition, the granting of authority by the state to villages to become autonomous local governments can only be applied simultaneously in some villages in Indonesia. As a concrete solution, an evaluation of the principle of autonomy was carried out so that Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government was issued as a concrete form of correcting the previous Law, which then introduced two main principles, namely first, autonomy as broad as possible, honest and responsible, and second, the implementation of autonomy oriented towards improving the welfare of the people, ensuring harmonious relations between regions and ensuring harmonious relations between regions and the central government. On the other hand, there was the enactment of Law. No. 32 of 2004 on the granting of autonomy to village governments seems half-hearted; on the one hand, the authority is given to the regions to manage their regions; on the other hand, there are efforts by the center to control the regions excessively through its supervisory functions, both general, preventive and repressive supervision, so that when examined in depth there appears to be a tendency to return to the power scheme that occurred during the New Order era.

Moreover, central government policy based on Article 202 paragraph (3) of Law No. 32/2004 states that village secretaries must be filled by civil servants who meet the requirements. This law also explains that village secretaries without civil servants are gradually appointed civil servants under the legislation. Later, the regulation on filling village secretaries as civil servants was reemphasized in Government Regulation 72/2005 on Villages. Strengthening the bureaucratization of the village government is further strengthened by appointing the village secretary (*sekdes/carik*) as a civil servant, in line with the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy.

The state presents village governance in a uniform form of government - typical of New Order villages, which automatically undermines the specific characteristics of local community entities. The adoption of this bureaucratic system indicates the Westernization of village governance.³ One concept is forced to be the same for a very diverse thing. Although the state provides opportunities for specific characteristics, the reality is that each village government's distinctive style is increasingly being crushed from time to time. Indeed, in addition to the state providing these opportunities, it should also strive to revitalize them actively rather than limiting them with various ideal types that further corner the village's distinctiveness.

This condition is complicated by the presence of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) as mandated by Law No. 1999 concerning Regional Government, which is emphasized by the Regional Regulation of North Lampung Regency No. 15 of 2006 concerning Village Consultative Bodies and Village Community Institutions, article 4 paragraph 2 point b which regulates the authority of the Village Consultative Body, namely overseeing the implementation of village regulations in the context of stabilizing the implementation of village government performance. On this basis, the Village Consultative Body (BPD) of Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai, exercised its authority in overseeing the performance of the village head (*Zubaidi*), hoping to dynamize the implementation of democracy in the village. However, it also created new problems in the life of the village community. The conflict between the village secretary who dragged the Village Representative Body (BPD) into the vortex of conflict with the village head occurred in Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai, North Lampung, which resulted in a prolonged conflict between

² Dadang Julianoro and Hatta Sunanto, "Menggeser Pembangunan, Memperkuat Rakyat: Emansipasi Dan Demokrasi Mulai Dari Desa," (*No Title*), 2000. hlm 21.

³ Heru Cahyono, "Konflik Elite Politik Di Pedesaan: Relasi Antara Badan Perwakilan Desa Dan Pemerintah Desa," *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* 2, no. 1 (2016): hlm. 73–84.

the Village Consultative Body (BPD) and the definitive Village Head (Zubaidi). Therefore, the problem formulation in this research is: How is the pattern of shifting power relations between the Village Consultative Body and the village head that gave birth to the conflict?

This research aims to explain the relationship between the shifting power relations of the village secretary of the village head by examining several matters related to the objectives: Finding patterns of shifting power relations between the Village Consultative Body and the village head that gave birth to conflict in Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai, North Lampung Regency. The contribution of this research is to contribute ideas about the need for a more thorough explanation of the authority of each institution in the countryside so as not to cause different interpretations according to their respective tastes, which ultimately lead to conflict—first, the theory of power. The critical word often used to understand power is "influence"; in this case, power is interpreted as an action taken by someone to "influence" others. Of course, the influence of someone is in order to realize the wishes of those who influence him. Therefore, *power* is often defined as "the ability (capacity) of a person to influence others to act by his wishes."

Weber's thoughts on power heavily influence this general limitation of power. Weber states power as "the chance of a man or several men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others participating in it".⁴ In Weber's limitation, the keyword "influence" becomes essential even though this gets an act of resistance from the other party. In a relatively identical limitation to Weber, R.H. Tawney explains power as "the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not".⁵ Both limitations place power in a zero-sum concept, which can be analogized as one party gaining and another suffering losses. Because of this zero-sum approach, power is inevitable in a conflictual situation with the logic that each other from the conflicting classes will try to maintain or gain their power. Thus, power relations are pretty appropriate to be studied from the Marxian approach, which views that in power relations, there is always a dominant class (superordinate) and a subordinated class. Therefore, it is possible to have a resistance movement, as is typical of Marxists.⁶

Understanding Marxian power relations can be traced from its approach's four cornerstones: First, power relations manifest a particular mode or configuration of class domination rather than as a purely interpersonal relationship phenomenon.⁷ Second, power relations pay close attention to the relationship between economic, political and ideological class domination. Third, power relations pay attention to the limitations inherent in many executions of power rooted in one class or another form of class domination and try to explain these in terms of structural contradictions and antagonisms.⁸ Fourth, the Marxian focus is on strategies and tactics to reproduce, maintain or overthrow class domination.⁹

Furthermore, Dahrendorf's conflict theory sees a close relationship between conflict and social change. According to him, all creativity, innovation, and development in the lives of individuals, groups,

⁴ Thomas Janoski et al., *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Hlm. 76

⁵ Janoski et al.. hlm 87

⁶ Peter Beilharz and Sigit Jatmiko, *Teori-Teori Sosial: Observasi Kritis Terhadap Para Filosof Terkemuka* (Pustaka pelajar, 2002). Hlm. 25

⁷ Kate Nash and Alan Scott, *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology* (John Wiley & Sons, 2008). Hlm. 43

⁸ Cahyono, "Konflik Elite Politik Di Pedesaan: Relasi Antara Badan Perwakilan Desa Dan Pemerintah Desa." hlm. 34

⁹ Francine D Blau and Lawrence M Kahn, "Gender Differences in Pay," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14, no. 4 (2000): hlm. 75–100.

and society are caused by conflicts between groups, individuals, and between emotions and emotions within individuals. Dahrendorf further explained that social conflict has a structural source, namely the power relations that apply in the structure of social organization. In other words, social conflict between groups can be seen from the conflict angle about the validity of existing power relations.

In his analysis, Dahrendorf considers that, empirically, group conflict is most easily analyzed when seen as a conflict over the legitimacy of power relations. In any association, the interests of the ruling group are the values that constitute the ideology of its legitimacy. In contrast, the underclass's interests threaten this ideology and the social relations it embodies.¹⁰

Dahrendorf's approach is based on the assumption that authority relations imperatively coordinate all social systems. Authority is a characteristic of general social organizations such as society itself. Those who exercise authority and those subject to it must have conflicting interests.¹¹ The ruling class's interests include maintaining the legitimacy of its dominant position, or in other words, maintaining the status quo, while the interests of the lower class are to challenge the legitimacy of the existing authority structure. Conflicting interests are determined by the authority structure's nature, not by the orientation of the individuals involved.

There are several articles that have relevance to this paper. The first is an article written by Munandar which discusses various conflict resolutions in rural areas. In his article, he concludes that the basics of conflict are differences or contradictions in social value orientation and the degradation of the meaning of socio-cultural values and traditional ceremonies. Socio-cultural values (ritual and art traditions) have the potential as social capital for peace because they can motivate and foster peace and are conducive to mobilizing and fostering cooperation, responsibility, joint problem solving, expanding the network of social relations, a sense of social solidarity and honesty. The government and society must foster socio-cultural values of peace and harmony with a conducive system that actualizes and revitalizes traditional arts and ceremonies through rational, logical and religious and professional enlightenment.¹² Another article written by Ahmad Taufik discusses Conflict Management in the Village Head Election in Bantaeng Regency. In the article, the author concludes that competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, and accomodating are steps to resolve conflicts in village elections in Bantaeng Regency.¹³

The choice of paradigm in this research uses a critical paradigm as a case of conflict between the Village Head and the Village Consultative Body in Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai Sub-district, North Lampung Regency. Data collection was planned by document study, direct observation and in-depth interview techniques based on purposive information collection through essential informant sampling techniques, namely informants with specific retrieval who are considered to master the problem, especially the two key figures of the village secretary and village head through direct dialogue.¹⁴ The number of samples follows the principle of snowball sampling of informants consisting of the village head, village secretary, village officials (head of government, chairman of the Village Consultative Body, and community leaders. Data analysis was conducted qualitatively through data reduction, data presentation and conclusion drawing.

¹⁰ Nico Schulte Nordholt, *Ojo Dumej; Kepemimpinan Lokal Dalam Pembangunan Pedesaan* (Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1987). Hlm. 54

¹¹ Dahrendorf Ralf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (California: Stanford University Press, 1959) hlm. 63.

¹² M. Munandar Sulaeman, "Dasar-Dasar Konflik Dan Model Resolusi Konflik Pada Masyarakat Desa Pantura Jabar," *Sosiohumaniora* 12, no. 2 (July 4, 2010): 175, <https://doi.org/10.24198/sosiohumaniora.v12i2.5449>.

¹³ Ahmad Taufik and Hamrun Hamrun, "Tata Kelola Konflik Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Desa di Kabupaten Bantaeng," *Jurnal Politikom Indonesiana* 3, no. 1 (July 31, 2018): 14–14, <https://doi.org/10.35706/jpi.v3i1.1408>.

¹⁴ Denzim and Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (California: Thausan Oaks-Sage Publications, 1994). Hlm. 87

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Conflict in the Frame of Local Democracy

The conflict between the village heads, which ended with the Karangrejo village secretary being deactivated from his position and returned to the South Sungkai District of North Lampung, is a concrete form of local (village) political elite conflict. The conflict that occurred between local elites (village) Karangrejo South Sungkai North Lampung was motivated by several things, including the existence of interests among the actors (village head, village secretary and actors in the Village Consultative Body) therefore researchers identified several factors that caused the conflict between the village head and the village secretary, including:

Leadership Contestation

After Suanto's leadership ended in 2008, in the contestation of leadership in Karangrejo village, followed by three candidates (Zubaidi, Bambang Hartoyo and Syahroni) Zubaidi was able to eliminate the other two candidates. During Zubaidi's leadership (village head) period I (2008-2013), Sukamto was appointed as the village secretary, continuing the position he held when the village head was Suanto, while the Chairman of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) was UstAz. Zainuddin was none other than his relative. Sukamto, appointed as the village secretary in 2016, has experience managing the village administration since the leadership period before Zubaidi became the village head.

The birth of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) as the village parliament is a mandate of Law No. 32/2004, which is expected to be a vehicle for the people to be involved in public affairs and the process of making village policies. However, in Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai, and North Lampung, this idea has yet to be fully implemented; in fact, the presence of new institutions at the village level has the potential to create conflict between village elites. The presence of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) in the political constellation in rural areas as an institution that oversees the work of the executive, its existence as an "opposition" to the executive is seen as an institution that disturbs the establishment that has been maintained, which also means a change in the structure of village government that no longer places the village head as the center of power without any control.

Various strategies taken by the village head (Zubaidi) to tame or castrate the Village Consultative Body (BPD) in the hope that its presence will not become an obstacle to the executive's (village head) steps, Zubaidi (village head) tries to play a pattern of collusion/collaboration to create a concentration of political power in the hands of the village head as during the New Order era. One example of a village head (Zubaidi) policy that received the approval of the chairman of the BPD, which eventually caused polemics and even toppled him (Ustz Zainuddin) from the chairman of the BPD, was the policy of converting village land (tanah bengkok)⁵ of 120,000 square meters..

The policy to convert this land became a protracted polemic among community members that led to a distrust of the new institution, "Village Consultative Body," resulting in a vote of no confidence in Ustz Zainuddin's leadership and an attempt to remove him from power as chairman of the BPD. This movement was led by Heri Padmono, a member of the BPD and received support from Sukamto (village secretary), who is none other than his older brother. In the end, refer to the Village Law no 16 of 2014 article 59 paragraph (1), which states that the BPD leader is from and by BPD members in a specially held meeting. The meeting of the BPD members of Karangrejo Village on October 12, 2013, consisted of 5 (five) BPD members who unanimously agreed to elect Heri Padmono.

Since the leadership of the BPD is in the hands of Heri Padmono, the BPD can demonstrate its function as a village institution/parliament that oversees the performance of the village head. There was

a shift in the pattern of social power relations that resulted in polarization between the village head (Zubaidi) and the BPD chairman (Heri Padmono) as a form of antagonistic relations, and this condition lasted until the end of Zubaidi's leadership in 2013. This Phenomenon shows that the BPD as a new institution introduced after the Law. N0. 22 of 1999 in context; the BPD functions as a very instrumental institution, namely as a tool for inter-elite political battles, meaning that there is a rivalry of power between the old political elites by finding, using, and utilizing new battlegrounds and institutions.

The battle utilizing this new arena lasted until Zubaidi's term of office ended in 2013 and escalated when Sukanto (the village secretary) was more inclined and antagonistic to Zubaidi (the village head) and favoured the Village Consultative Body (BPD) headed by Heri Padmono. Moreover, after the first leadership period in 2013, the village head (Zubaidi) was appointed as a temporary official (PJS) for two years to welcome the Pilkades (Village Head Elections) simultaneously in 2015, which became a program of the Regional Government of North Lampung Regency Level II). The period leading up to the local leadership transition (Pilkadesa) for the village community, in general, was a time to look forward to. The community was segregated into several groups: firstly, those who wanted to continue the previous leadership (Continue), those who were related to Zubaidi, especially since in the 80s Zubaidi's parents (Yarkoni) had been the village head in Karangrejo. Secondly, there is a group that wants a change in leadership, Heri Padmono leads this community group.

The Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 112 of 2014 on Simultaneous Village Elections explains that the implementation of simultaneous village head elections is further regulated by Regional Regulation (Perda) after the approval of North Lampung Regional Regulation No. 7 of 2015, the implementation of village head elections can be scheduled. Establishing this regional regulation is essential for the government and the people of North Lampung. This fact is because out of 232 villages, 120 are still led by village head officials because the definitive village head has ended his term of office.¹⁵

The village head election in North Lampung Regency was set for November 19, 2015, and four candidates emerged, namely: Zubaidi (incumbent), Heri Padmono (Chairman of BPD), Nanang Hariyanto (independent candidate), and Suanto (village head 2003-2008). That Zubaidi eventually won the leadership contest in Karangrejo village was predictable, despite the large number of community members who wanted change with the birth of a new leader. This change was closely related to the dividing line between the santri and the abangan groups, where Zubaidi was supported by Kyai Wahid Ansyori, the caretaker of the An-Nur Islamic boarding school, the only boarding school in Karangrejo village that was established on March 20, 2007, meaning that Zubaidi (the village head candidate) and Kyai Wahid Abdullah built a religious solidarity relationship above family relations. Although Zubaidi is not from among the santri, his extended family (his father/Yarkoni) is an influential Muhammadiyah figure and has a close relationship with Kyai Wahid Ansyori (as a Nahdatul Ulama figure), on various occasions Kyai Wahid (recitation) always invites his congregation to win Zubaidi again so that the programs that have been running can be continued.¹⁶ In addition, in his campaign Zubaidi relied on himself as a candidate who had historical rights in the village as a descendant of Karangrejo officials, which was also a factor that led to his victory in the contestation of simultaneous village heads in North Lampung.

The support of Kyai Wahid Ansyori, the leader of the An-Nur Islamic boarding school, who is affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama, for Zubaidi, who is a Muhammadiyah person, to become the village head

¹⁵ Arya Hadi Dharmawan, Fredian Tonny, and Yoyoh Indaryanti, "Pembauran Tata Pemerintahan Desa Berbasis Lokalitas Dan Kemitraan," 2006. Hlm. 32

¹⁶ Richard M Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 1962, hlm. 31–41.

in the simultaneous village head election in Karangrejo village is an interesting thing to observe. When viewed from an ideological point of view, this is very likely to happen, given that there is a conflictual world that will never be finished and will never be liquid in such a way. However, in the case of the village head election (pilkades), the ideological world is so fluid that it can be underlined that organizational affiliation and religious understanding are not related to the choice in the pilkades in Karangrejo village.

Zubaidi's success in becoming Village Head for the second period is closely related to his work in various associations built by his extended family. However, his success was supported by a territorial group, which is a group of residents who are close to each other (neighbors) or more or less equivalent to an administrative area at the RT level, or includes around 30 (thirty) heads of families (KK). Thus, we can say that support for a village head candidate coming from a territorial group can also be interpreted as support from residents of kin groups and also residents of various associations because they are all connected overlappingly. In other words, groupings based on territorial units are aggregations of other primary groups.¹⁷

Uniformity and New Interpretation

The state after the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 has made a new policy that is essentially in the form of new uniformity, namely the existence of Government Regulation Number 72 of 2005 which positions the village secretary (sekdes/carik) in the position of State Civil Apparatus (ASN) or in a more familiar language as a Civil Servant (PNS) and forms the Village Consultative Body (BPD) as a concrete form of decentralization / forced village autonomy. The presence of these two policies creates a dilemma, because not all villages, including Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai Subdistrict, North Lampung, are ready for the democratic model of the Consultative Body and the policy of appointing village secretaries with positions as State Civil Servants along with the authority attached to their shoulders. This is because it is more harmonious and comfortable with the direct supervision system and the appointment of village secretaries involving the community through local institutions in building active community participation autonomously. In Karangrejo Village, South Sungkai, North Lampung, a regulatory controversy occurred with the issuance of a decision to return (Sukamto) to the Subdistrict and relinquish his position as Village Secretary in Karangrejo. This decision by the village head was considered controversial by the Village Secretary (Sukamto), who also received support from the BPD (Heri Padmono CS). Both institutions believe that the issuance of the decree was made without careful consideration, and that the decree of the Karangrejo village head (Zubaidi) was solely aimed at eliminating the village secretary who was a rival in the leadership contestation for the second term of office for the village head (Zubaidi) without following the applicable procedures. The controversy and opposition to the decree was even widespread, both from the village secretary (Sukamto) who was ill, as well as by the 7 RT heads and 3 RW heads of Karangrejo village, some village officials⁶, the sub-district government and the district government.

Actually, when examined further, the conflict between the village head and the village secretary supported by the BPD in Karangrejo village is due to an excessive interpretation of the regulations so that in the exercise of authority each party feels more powerful. Perda No. 31/2001 article 7 point d (which is corroborated by article 4 paragraph e of North Lampung Regent Decree No. 142/20/2002 on Guidelines for the Preparation of Village Council Rules of Procedure) states that the BPD has the authority and obligation to supervise: (1) the implementation of village regulations and village head

¹⁷ Bambang Hidayana, "Glembuk, Strategi Politik Dalam Rekrutmen Elite Penguasa Di Desa Pulungansari Yogyakarta," *Humaniora* 23, no. 1 (2011): hlm. 1–15.

decisions, (2) the implementation of the village budget, (3) village government policies, (4) the implementation of cooperation between villages or with other parties.

Based on the description above, in general, the duties and authority of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) are to oversee the running of the village government, but based on many observations in terms of the application of the authority of the Village Consultative Body is too excessive, not limited to overseeing but has led to interference in the running of the village government, which is also supported by the Village Secretary (Sukamto). The most prominent example is in the filling of village official positions. According to the applicable regulations, namely Perda. No. 21/2002 article 8 paragraph 1.c states that the Village Consultative Body (BPD) has the duty and authority to recommend the appointment, temporary dismissal of the village head, village officials, and village staff. Based on this provision, the appointment of village officials,¹⁸ The Village Consultative Body only has the authority to propose the appointment of village officials, not to determine village officials. There was a difference in interpretation between the village head and the Village Consultative Body, which was supported by the village secretary.

Zubaidi (elected village head) after winning the election contestation for the second time on November 19, 2015 by eliminating 3 (three) of his political opponents (Nanang Hariyanto and Heru Padmono and Suanto) conducted political maneuvers in the form of a reshuffle of the Karangrejo village apparatus structure, including returning the village secretary (Sukamto) as village secretary (PNS) to South Sungkai Sub-district. Heri Padmono, who previously served as the Chairman of the Village Consultative Body (BPD), resigned because he was contesting the village head election, considering Zubaidi's (the village head) actions to be in violation of applicable regulations. The following is Heri Padmono's narrative as known to the author:

I can understand that the reshuffle of village officials is the prerogative of the village head, but the village head must follow the existing rules and procedures, meaning that there are regulations governing the procedures for dismissal and appointment of village officials. The appointment and dismissal of village officials must refer to the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs (Permendagri) Number: 83/2015 and North Lampung Regional Regulation Number 25/2015 concerning Village Government and Village Consultative Bodies (BPD).

Based on the information above, it is clear that there are standard rules regarding the dismissal and appointment of village officials, meaning that the village head cannot act as he wishes, even though it is his prerogative so that it does not cause prolonged polemics as is currently happening. According to the Village Administration and Village Consultative Body (BPD), the mechanism of Pemendagri Number: 83/2015 and North Lampung Regional Regulation Number 25/2015 concerning Village Administration and Village Consultative Body (BPD).

The mechanism for appointing village officials, the village head must form a team to screen candidates for village officials, which takes a maximum of two months after the position of village officials is vacant or dismissed. At least two candidates for village officials are consulted by the village head to the sub-district head. The sub-district head then gives a written recommendation on the candidates no later than seven working days. After that, the village head issues an appointment decree. As for the dismissal of village officials, the village head must consult with the Camat first. The dismissal of village officials, if the person concerned dies, resigns and is dismissed. Village officials who are dismissed, among others, if

¹⁸ Gamze Yücesan-Özdemir, "Hidden Forms of Resistance among Turkish Workers: Hegemonic Incorporation or Building Blocks for Working Class Struggle?," *Capital & Class* 27, no. 3 (2003): hlm. 31–59.

they have reached the age of 60, are declared convicted with an inkrah decision, this dismissal must also be consulted with the sub-district head at least four days before it is determined.

In fact, the village head of Karangrejo (Zubaidi), who won the election in the second period, took actions that were considered contrary to applicable regulations. Zubaidi made changes to village officials, starting with the village secretary, Sukamto (civil servant village secretary), by returning him to the South Sungkai sub-district, and other village officials, such as the head of government affairs (Kaur)..

Head of Family Association III. A. Muhtadi said that he and his colleagues had been verbally dismissed by the village head of Karangrejo (Zubaidi). "Last night, all village officials without exception were sent home and not allowed to deal with village affairs," He admitted that the dismissal was unilateral. In fact, he admitted that the dismissal was based on allegations of political promises to his success team during the Pilkades some time ago. He added that the news that there would be a massive reshuffle had been widely heard and even the names of the new village officials had been spread in the community. "There should be a mechanism, not just firing, a very authoritarian action," he said..

Separately, the Head of Karangrejo Village, Zubaidi, said that dismissing all village officials was his prerogative. Apart from that, he wants his government to have regeneration. "We put all of them at home and everyone agreed and was sincere. This is only temporary because there will be new ones later," said Zubaidi while the researcher was in his office. The appointment of the chairman of the Village Consultative Body (BPD), which was originally held by Heri Padmono (the younger brother of the Village Secretary) was full of the aroma of kinship, Turmuzy (the younger brother of the Village Head) served as head of Government and Development, village secretary Andri, as a result of which there was a prolonged conflict between the village head and the old Village Consultative Body institution.

Local Democracy At The Crossroads

The implementation of representative democracy as a form of village autonomy does not always produce harmony among village communities. However, on the contrary, the birth of elite conflicts in rural areas is generally marked by the involvement of elites who promote the interests of village political elites, especially the interests of the conflicting elite parties. Furthermore, elite conflicts that occur in rural areas only emerge around the political elite, meaning that perceptions regarding who is on the friend side and conversely which is the enemy side intensively only emerges around the political elite. The village head (Zubaidi), on the one hand, received support from some village officials outside the village secretary (Sukamto) and the head of government affairs (Jumadi), because the village secretary (Sukamto) had a different position, in fact he supported the Village Consultative Body which was chaired by his younger brother (Heri Padmono).), each of the two conflicting groups is trying to mobilize mass power as an effective basis of support for the interests of certain elites or groups, but such efforts do not seem to be completely fruitful.

In this context, the community knows that there has been a political dispute in their village, but the majority of Karangrejo village residents do not consider themselves to be part of the conflicting group or consider other community groups as competitors or opposing camps. Consolidation or feelings of hostility practically only infected the village political elite. Even if there are certain elements in the village that support certain parties in conflict, only a small and insignificant portion are said to be people who support or are involved in the conflict. Third, rural political elites always formulate and manipulate political issues without involving the community, so that the political issues that are developed are not genuine political issues that are being fought for. .

It is interesting to first listen to the motivation and potential that drives a village head candidate (Zubaidi, Heri Padmono) so that he wants to become a contestant. Even though it is known that for this

purpose, village head candidates are required to sacrifice time, energy, and especially a relatively large amount of funds, especially when village head candidates have to go into campaigning to gather as much mass support as possible from voters.

The Village Consultative Body is an embodiment of democracy and proof of community involvement in the implementation of village government. During the New Order era, community involvement in the administration of village government was carried out through the formation of Village Deliberative Institutions (LMD) and Village Community Resilience Institutions (LKMD). However, these two institutions do not function proportionally, even only as extensions of the village head, this is due to the strong dominance and hegemony of the village head (UU.9/1975) regarding village government. Therefore, after the 1999 reform, several laws regarding villages were issued, including UU.32/2004. Apart from the law. 32/2004 which regulates regional government, the Village Consultative Body and Village government, PP.72/2005 also emerged which regulates guidelines for the formation of BPD as a manifestation of representative democracy at the local level.

The model of representative democracy implemented in villages through the formation of Village Representative Body institutions raises new problems, including; Firstly, a new institutional oligarchy (BPD) emerged which was not a representation of village residents, meaning that the presence of the BPD which was expected to be able to capture and accommodate community aspirations actually became a platform for rivalry and representation of rural elites in fighting for power and village political and economic resources. Karangrejo village residents want the BPD to fight for ownership rights and control of cultivated land for agricultural activities, while the BPD is more busy developing and packaging strategic issues in leadership contestations at the village level. The oligarchy of political power is increasingly thickening in the form of conflicting groupings between supporters of the village head Zubaidi and supporters of Heri Padmono who are also supported by Sukanto (village secretary/brother of Heri Padmono), which is a continuation of the battle in the contestation for the leadership of the village head (simultaneous village elections). in North Lampung Regency on November 19 2015).

Here there is a change in meaning from village autonomy to autonomy of rural political elites, the Village Consultative Body actually formulates and fights for the interests of rural elites rather than the interests and aspirations of the community as should be in accordance with its main tasks and functions.¹⁹ This means the aim of village autonomy as stated in the Law. 32/2004 was not achieved. Second, the implementation of a system of representative democracy in rural areas gives rise to compartmentalization and tendencies towards anarchy which actually complicates the arena of conflict in rural areas. BPD members tend to manipulate support from each RK (Rukun Kampung) where they come from, thus making village communities increasingly divided in conflict. This means that the logic of representative democracy does not work, and in fact gives rise to scenes that are counter-productive for the development of democracy in rural areas. The failure to implement the principles of representative democracy in rural areas forces the need to think about additional mechanisms that might be used as a vehicle to make the role of BPD more effective for development in rural areas. This is based on the reality in the field which shows that the BPD claims to be the people's representative, but on the other hand there is no mechanism available that allows the Village Consultative Body to provide accountability reports to its constituent people, and on the other hand provides space for the government to provide input to the Consultative Body. Village. It is important to emphasize the accountability of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) in order to minimize the tendency for this institution to become an elitist

¹⁹ Nordholt, *Ojo Dumei; Kepemimpinan Lokal Dalam Pembangunan Pedesaan*. Hlm. 12

institution and no longer fight for the aspirations of its people. Moreover, it is difficult to detect from the start that the Village Consultative Body is not only used as a political vehicle for its members. Currently what the village needs is another institution that can control the BPD. Institutions that have the authority (for example from the sub-district) to hold the BPD accountable for its performance.

This additional mechanism will also maximize the BPD so that it is not only focused on meetings or gatherings held at the village hall, but the BPD actively meets and meets face to face with its people. This expansion of public space can be carried out by activating various social groups, dialogue forums, or citizen networks, local organizations and institutions that grow in society, whether based on culture, work or religion (mosque congregation forums), as one of the corporatist social organizations in villages, BPDs must still be actively supervised by community members in the policy-making process. In the end, the ideals of rural democracy depend on the will and ability of village residents themselves to organize themselves into an autonomous civil power. This is because the success of village autonomy is largely determined by the extent to which village communities can express their needs and participate in the development process taking place in their village. That the real implications of village autonomy should be visible in the empowerment activities of the village community itself.

CONCLUSION

The development of autonomy in a local democratic format marked by the presence of a new institution "Village Representative Body" has given rise to various problems for village communities. On the one hand, the presence of the BPD is highly expected so that the direction of autonomy can truly be realized in the sense of autonomy not only among village elites, However, on the other hand, the presence of the Village Representative Body has actually become an institution that is difficult to control and ignores the aspirations of the community, plus the village government is also sometimes trapped in conflict. Even though conflict between village institutions occurs at the elite level in the form of tension between elites and does not involve massive mass conflict, this condition results in services to the community being neglected, so that development programs that should be able to improve community welfare, instead cause suffering. and the misery of society. There is no clause for resolving conflicts between institutions in rural areas, either in Law Number 22 of 1999 or several regional regulations (perda) regarding how to resolve conflicts when tensions arise, as happened in Karangrejo village, South Sungkai, North Lampung. However, in villages where local institutions have weakened and lost their authority, leaders (religious elites) have received less respect, traditional leaders (traditional elites) have no authority, then conflicts between village institutions will grow bigger and remain unresolved. Even though the institution (Village Consultative Body) is a form of sovereignty of village residents, several things need to be taken into consideration in its formation so that its presence does not actually create divisions in society. First, avoid uniformity as occurred during the New Order era in legislation, because each village has its own characteristics which constitute wealth (local wisdom) and need to be maintained. Second, it is reformulated more clearly and in detail regarding the functions and authority that must be carried out by the Village Representative Body so that in practice it does not tend to become overcapacity. Third, regional governments need to provide additional mechanisms that enable BPD to convey accountability to its constituents, as well as a form of effort to expand public space where the people in general can provide input to BPD.

The superior role of the Village Representative Body is based on regulations that give authority to the BPD (UU. 32/2004) to propose the appointment and dismissal of the Village Head to the Regent. This authority has motivated the growing politicization of the BPD institution to behave arrogantly and

on the other hand has made some village heads perceive the BPD as an institution that threatens their existence, so that psychologically the village head views the BPD as a competitor. Thus, since the beginning of UU.32/2004, it has given rise to the seeds of hostility between the two institutions (BPD and village head). It is possible that the BPD is becoming a new oligarchy in the name of the people's interests, therefore there is a need for revisions at all levels of laws both at the national, provincial and district levels.

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